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Introduction
Moral philosophy used to be full of promises. In ancient times, it aimed at providing a guide to 
the good life that integrated moral matters with other concerns (such as our intellectual, aesthetic 
and prudential interests). In modern times, it set out to present a supreme principle of morality 
(such as Kant’s categorical imperative, or the greatest happiness principle of utilitarianism) from 
which a full-blown system of obligations and permissions was meant to be derived, guiding or 
constraining our conduct. 
However, if Adorno is to be believed, the promises of moral philosophy have not been 
fulfilled: neither the good life, nor even the moral life, is currently available. In this sense, his 
position can be characterised as a negative moral philosophy. What makes this position 
interesting is why Adorno thinks that both the good life and the moral life are blocked and what 
implications he draws from this, in terms of criticising the dominant strands of modern moral 
philosophy and suggesting how we should live our distorted and deformed lives. 
In this essay we will look at each of these aspects and ask the following questions:
1. Why can no one live the right life in our current social world? 
2. Why does the task of moral philosophy today consist essentially in the critique of 
moral philosophy? 
3. Does Adorno say anything about how we should live, or is his negative moral 
philosophy devoid of any practical guidance?
The Impossibility of Right Living Today
Adorno is not alone in thinking that something is problematic about ethical practice and theory in 
the modern social world. For example, contemporary Aristotelians often lament the breakdown 
of traditional social practices which (supposedly) underwrote the exercise of the virtues.1 Yet 
Adorno’s thesis that ‘[w]rong life cannot be lived rightly’2 is distinctive in a number of ways. 
Firstly, Adorno’s thesis is distinctive because of his particular conception of the modern 
social world. One way to describe this conception is to say that the modern social world 
(especially in the post-1930s stage of ‘late capitalism’) is radically evil. This is not to invoke 
theology, where talk of ‘radical evil’ traditionally had its place, but to express this two-fold 
claim: (1) late capitalism is evil to the root (evil is not accidental to it, or only a surface 
phenomenon); and (2) this evil is particularly grave (it does not get more evil than this). 
The clearest example of why Adorno thinks that late capitalism is radically evil is the 
genocide of the European Jews. For Adorno, this genocide was not an accidental relapse into 
barbaric times, or due to the fact that modern civilisation had not fully taken root in Germany. 
Rather, these events mean that enlightenment culture as a whole has failed in important respects.3 
This culture, and the modern social world that gave rise to it, are deeply implicated in the moral 
catastrophe of Auschwitz. They constitute the ‘objective conditions’ for its occurrence and 
unless they are overcome, a moral catastrophe of the same kind is possible again.4 More 
1 See A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 2nd ed. 1985).
2 Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, tr. E. F. N. Jephcott 
(London: Verso, 1991), p. 39. Hereafter MM.
3 Idem, Negative Dialectics, tr. E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 
366f. Hereafter ND.
4 Idem, ‘Education after Auschwitz’, Can One Live after Auschwitz? A Philosophical Reader, tr. 
Rodney Livingstone et al. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 20f. Note that Adorno 
does not advocate renouncing the enlightenment culture completely, but merely insists on it 
generally, what happened to the victims in the concentration camps is what late capitalism is 
moving towards: the liquidation of anything individual, the degradation of people to things, and 
the triumph of bureaucratic rationality at the expense of deeper reflection about ends and means. 
Here, we have a clear example in which late capitalism is radically evil in the two senses 
mentioned: Auschwitz was a moral catastrophe of the gravest kind and its occurrence (and the 
threat of its reoccurrence) is systematically connected to our current social world. 
Adorno says that right living is not possible because, in a radically evil social setting, 
whatever we do short of changing this setting will likely implicate us in its evil--either, indirectly 
insofar as we contribute to maintaining this social setting where it should be changed, or directly 
by actually participating in and furthering particular evils within it. In other words, in most cases 
we can only hope that we do not participate actively and directly in evils. However, even if we 
do not participate actively and directly, to think that this would constitute right living would 
mistake a lucky and merely partial escape for more than it is. Even then, we would still be part of 
a guilt context, that is, we would still contribute to the continuity of a radically evil world.5
Secondly, Adorno’s thesis that we cannot live rightly in this social world is phrased in a 
distinctive way. He always speaks of ‘right life’ [‘richtiges Leben’], rather than the more 
incorporating the reflection on its regressive tendency.
5 This obviously raises the complex issue of individual responsibility. Since society determines 
individuals, it would seem that they are not responsible for their wrong-doing (see, for example, 
ND, 219). In fact, Adorno was sceptical of conceptions of freedom (such as Kant’s) in which 
people can be held responsible and punished (see, for example, ND, 215, 232, 255). Yet he also 
rejects the suggestion that those who do evil should be let off; specifically, he rejects this in 
respect to the perpetrators of Nazism (see ND, 264f, 286f). Hence there appears to be an 
inconsistency in his thinking. Yet, Adorno responds that this inconsistency expresses an 
‘objective antagonism’ (ND, 286) or ‘antinomy’ (ND, 264) between the legitimate desire (and 
social need) not to let crimes go unpunished, and the impossibility of pinning evil acts on the 
individual as the agent responsible for them.
traditional ‘good life’ [‘gutes Leben’].6 He does so deliberately. With the phrase ‘right life’, he 
can exploit an ambiguity between using ‘right’ in a normative sense and contrasting it to ‘wrong’ 
(as in ‘this is not the right thing to do’), on the one hand, and using it in a factual sense and 
contrasting it to ‘false’ or ‘counterfeit’ (as in ‘this is a false beard’), on the other. Exploiting this 
ambiguity allows Adorno to say both (a) that moral living is not possible in today’s world and 
(b) that no real living is taking place. While these two aspects are dialectically entwined, I will 
begin by analysing them separately, before considering the underlying explanation for both.
The possibility of morally right living is blocked partly because we are caught in the guilt 
context of our radically evil society, but partly for further reasons. Firstly, within this guilt 
context we almost always get caught in ideologies, that is, we hold a set of beliefs, attitudes and 
preferences which are distorted in ways that benefit the established social order (and the 
dominant social group within it) at the expense of the satisfaction of people’s real interests. To 
defend our behaviour (e.g., holding on to our possessions while others face severe deprivations), 
we often end up implicitly defending what should be criticised, namely, late capitalism or 
elements thereof (e.g., its property regime).7 And even where we do not attempt to justify our 
way of life, we tend to fall prey to ideological distortions, so that we accept social arrangements 
as they are, instead of changing them as we should (this is true even of those who are most 
disadvantaged by these arrangements). Thus, either by endorsing or by unreflectively accepting 
distorted truths or half-truths, we entrench the social status quo and fail to do what we should do. 
Morally right living is also impossible today because we face practical ‘antinomies’. 
Adorno uses this Kantian term, which traditionally denotes ‘irresolvable conflicts’, in this sense: 
6 Unfortunately, some translators (such as Rodney Livingstone) use ‘good life’ and ‘bad life’ for 
‘richtiges Leben’ and ‘falsches Leben’, thereby obliterating the ambiguity with which Adorno 
plays.
7 See, for example, MM, 39. 
we are faced with conflicts which are not fully resolvable within the current social system, so 
that whatever we do, we cannot do the right thing. One example of such conflict involves 
compassion.8 On the one hand, while compassion is the right reaction to the suffering of others, it 
often only mitigates injustices and suffering within the current social system. It thereby might 
contribute to their persistence. On the other hand, working towards overcoming (not merely 
mitigating) injustices and suffering might mean that we do not always show people in need the 
compassion required by their situation. This is not just owing to a lack of imagination, but 
because of the social structures in which we find ourselves. 
In effect, Adorno thinks that we constantly face practical antinomies of this kind, and 
that, while tragic conflicts exist in all societies, at least some of these antinomies are irresolvable 
only within (or only occur because of) the social world we live in. Their pervasive existence is 
another reason why life in this social world is wrong and why right living is blocked.
Let me now turn to the second aspect of Adorno’s thesis. Here, the thought is that what 
we normally refer to as the life we live is actually something which falls short of it (what might 
be called ‘surviving’ or ‘getting by’). ‘Life does not live’ (MM, 19)9 for two reasons. Firstly, 
under a capitalist economy and culture, life becomes more and more uniform and impoverished 
(and this is true even of that small part of humanity who can make full use of the goods and 
opportunities afforded by late capitalism). Secondly, and related to this point, life does not live 
because we do not actually and actively live it. We lack autonomy in the sense of not being able 
to exercise our capacity for self-determination. At most, we merely react to external or internal 
pressures, and this is connected to the social world which surrounds and forms us. Even where 
8 T.W. Adorno, Problems of Moral Philosophy, tr. by R. Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), 
pp. 173f. Hereafter PMP.
9 This is a quotation from the nineteenth century Austrian writer Ferndinand Kürnberger, 
employed by Adorno as motto for the first part of Minima Moralia.
we seem to act against society by following our self-interest, we are, in fact, serving and 
maintaining a social system which often relies on people acting in this way.10 In other words, 
Adorno turns Adam Smith on his head: instead of capitalism’s invisible hand mechanisms 
making possible a prosperous and moral society, they enable a radically evil society that depletes 
natural and human resources to sustain itself.
Finally, this already points to Adorno’s distinctive explanation for why right living (in 
both senses of the term) is impossible. It is not merely that traditional social practices are 
lacking, or that the boundless reflection characteristic of modern reason destroys ethical 
knowledge. Rather, right living is also blocked because society undermines our autonomy. This 
marks an interesting shift from traditional philosophical conceptions of obstacles to freedom: 
instead of first nature (natural events or our psychological make-up) endangering our freedom 
and autonomy, ‘second nature’, or society, is the main obstacle. In other words, Adorno agrees 
with Kant and the tradition that ‘human beings are unfree because they are beholden to 
externality’. But this ‘externality’ is not independent of human beings (as nature is said to be) but 
made and sustained by them as part of the social world (ND, 219, tr. mod.). As Adorno puts it: 
‘the intertwining of man and nature is also the intertwining of man and society’ (PMP, 176). 
The ‘intertwining of man and nature’ has two social dimensions. Firstly, the prevailing 
way of thinking about first nature--as a closed, determined system--does not reflect its actual 
reality. Rather, it reflects a particular social reality and the relationship with nature this involves. 
For Adorno, our conception of nature is shaped for the purposes of domination and exploitation, 
and, hence, it is no surprise that we think of nature as a closed system (ND, 269). Thinking about 
it in this way serves our purposes because it facilitates predictions (and control) of natural events. 
However, if we abstract from the way we conceive of nature for the purpose of dominating it, we 
10 See, for example, ND, 261f.
have no good evidence for thinking that nature--whether external nature or internal nature (our 
physical impulses and psychological make-up)--determines us in a way that endangers our 
freedom or autonomy.11 So we need not appeal to Kant’s metaphysical thesis of a different world 
underlying nature to make room for freedom. Rather, we should concentrate on the real factors 
which block our autonomy: autonomy is blocked by society, not first nature. 
Secondly, the intertwining of human beings and nature has a social dimension because 
we mistake determination by society, which we do in fact experience, for determination by 
nature. We do so partly because capitalist society is not the product of a consciously made 
history, but of something approximating natural growth--it is part of our natural history as 
vulnerable creatures who aim to master our surroundings to gain security. We also make this 
mistake because capitalism presents itself as if it were first nature, as if its Alaws@ were as fixed 
as the law of gravity. For example, capitalism operates mainly in an impersonal way--it is not a 
warrior elite which forces people to work and lead a certain life, but market pressures and other 
structural forces. It is therefore natural to overlook the real obstacles to our autonomy and to 
right living. To uncover these obstacles requires the kind of complex analysis of the underlying 
structure of capitalism that Marx presented in Capital.
In this section, we have seen what Adorno means by ‘wrong life cannot be lived rightly’ 
and his reasons for making this claim. Now, we should turn towards its implications for moral 
theorising and for whatever practical guidance Adorno can offer us.
Moral Philosophy as Critique
So far I have presented Adorno as saying that modern society creates the obstacles to moral 
11 Admittedly, this does not fully settle the matter, for even a non-deterministic nature may be 
inhospitable to human freedom (for further discussion of this problem, see my ‘Adorno's 
Negative Dialectics of Freedom’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 32, no. 2 (2006) pp. 429-40.)
living. Yet, even so, his moral philosophy might not differ greatly from traditional ones which 
theorise about examples, or conceptually analyse, say, the faculty of volition, to generate 
practical guidance in the form of principles for action, duties and permissions, or ideals and 
aspirational virtues. However, Adorno is sceptical of the success of such projects. Although we 
shall see that he does not completely exclude the possibility of moral theory containing some 
limited practical recommendations and prescriptions, he questions whether moral philosophers 
can offer us more than a minimalist ethics. In other words, he rejects the idea that moral theory 
could currently provide or underwrite a full-blown morality or a canonical plan for the good and 
right life. 
Adorno’s scepticism is broadly Hegelian in nature: the good and right life would actually 
have to be realised and institutionalised in the current social world to a significant degree for 
moral theory to provide a fully worked-out conception of the good life or morality.12 Otherwise, 
we are faced either with highly abstract, indeterminate and ultimately empty ideals with which to 
confront reality, without actually being able to give any detailed practical guidance; or we are 
stuck with a substantive ethics which is built on the wrong kind of social practices and 
institutions, so that we end up entrenching or legitimising unjust or bad states of affairs. Instead 
of adopting either of these extremes, the dialectical relations between them should be played out. 
If one combines these Hegelian concerns with Adorno’s premise that right living is 
currently impossible, then scepticism about moral theorising is the natural conclusion. From this 
perspective, the problems of moral practice (right living) affect moral theorising which cannot 
directly solve these problems--only a change in social practices would help. This why Adorno 
says that moral philosophy today should consist mainly in the critique of moral philosophy and 
12 Hegel expresses this view in the preface of Elements of a Philosophy of Right , tr. H. B. 
Nisbet, ed. A. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
its options: for, however much modern moral philosophers might differ, mainstream 
philosophers tend to suggest that a full set of practical guidance is possible. It is against this 
confidence that Adorno directs his scepticism.13 
Among moral theories, Adorno both criticises and values Kant’s ethics. His ambiguous 
stance is explained by the fact that he thinks Kant’s ethics reflects better the problematic state of 
affairs of moral theory and practice in the modern social world. Kant’s ethics is the most fruitful 
moral philosophy because, even where it gets things wrong, it captures best the antinomies and 
problems of moral living and theorising in the modern world. 
To see this more clearly, let us consider two examples of criticisms that Adorno advances 
against Kant. For Adorno, Kant’s ethics is characterised by its focus on principles (morality is 
anchored for Kant in a supreme principle, the categorical imperative14); by its formalism (its 
supreme principle is not a substantive, but a formal principle); by its emphasis on intentions 
rather than consequences; and by the idea that we can (and often should) act independently of 
our desires and physical impulses. Adorno objects to all four of these elements, but let us 
concentrate here on Kant’s formalism and on his idea that we acquire moral worth in virtue of 
our good intentions (our ‘good will’).15 
In respect to formalism, Adorno rejects the Kantian claim that the categorical imperative 
generates a set of specific duties. Equipped with this imperative alone, that is, with the demand 
that our subjective principles for action (‘maxims’) be suitable as universal laws, we will either 
13 For an excellent discussion of how Adorno’s views differ from the central claims of the 
dominant strand of modern moral philosophy, see R. Geuss, Outside Ethics (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005) Chapter 1.
14 In its universal law formulation, the categorical imperative states: ‘act in accordance with a 
maxim that can at the same time make itself a universal law’. See Kant’s Practical Philosophy, 
tr. and ed. M. J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 86. 
15 Kant, Practical Philosophy, op. cit., Part I. 
be left completely in the dark about what to do in specific circumstances; or, if we do hit upon 
specific obligations and guidelines, we will have to import them from somewhere else, such as, 
for example, from the social norms we have internalised as children.16 
Secondly, Adorno criticises Kant’s idea of an ethics of conviction or intention as follows. 
If our moral worth lies in our intentions, then there is the grave danger of people behaving self-
righteously and irresponsibly insofar as they insist simply on aiming at morality without any 
sense for the kind of havoc they might cause in doing so. Adorno illustrates this by discussing 
Ibsen’s play The Wild Duck17 where the main character, Gregers Werle, seems in many respects a 
perfect example of a Kantian moral agent in that he consistently strives for the good, even at the 
expense at his own self-interest. However, even as Werle exposes what he perceives as moral 
wrong-doing, his actions (and thereby the Kantian idea of moral agency), are called into question 
when they drive an innocent person to suicide. 
Far from suggesting here that we should not aim at eliminating moral wrongs, Adorno 
argues that we need to be sensitive to consequences as well--moral worth cannot be uncoupled 
from consequences.18 Moreover, in developing this objection to Kant’s ethics, Adorno also 
questions the very idea of having a pure intention to act morally. Making use of Freudian 
insights, he argues that, more often than not, what looks like a purely moral intention is actually 
the consequence of repressed drives or feelings of guilt (PMP, 162f). 
These examples also illustrate that Kantian ethics might be interesting and reflect some 
truth, even where it is (allegedly) wrong. Kant’s formalism is for Adorno in part the natural 
16 See, for example, PMP, 81-3; ND, 270f; on formalism, see also ND, 235-7. 
17 See PMP, Lecture 16. 
18 For an interesting Kantian reply, not to Adorno’s objection specifically, but to objections of 
this type, see B. Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press), especially Chapter 5.
extension of criticisms of traditional moral systems and in part a response to the breakdown of 
these systems, which used to provide people with specific roles and practical guidance. Many 
traditional, premodern systems were too narrow in their conception of moral agents or rights-
holders, and criticisms of them tend towards the idea of abstract and formal equality (expressed 
in the universalisability requirement of Kant’s categorical imperative). Yet, the progressive 
breakdown of these traditional systems required a new way of generating moral duties, and many 
theorists (including Kant) thought that abstract equality, and the principles based on it, would be 
suitable for this task. Their mistake did not come into full view until this breakdown was 
complete. In this sense, Kant, who lived during the transition, might not have fully realised that 
his ethics was both eroding and relying on the substantive moral systems that preceded him.19 
Similarly, it is natural to adopt an ethics of intention, given that we can be even less 
certain of how the consequences might work out in the modern world than in a traditional society 
where roles and responsibilities were clearly assigned (PMP, 98f). For Adorno thinks that 
whatever we do in late capitalism, we get caught in the guilt context of our radically evil society. 
In these circumstances, it is natural, and even to some extent admirable, to try to save morality 
by consigning it to the ‘sphere of interiority’, or to intentions. Yet, this can have the unacceptable 
consequence that what actually happens to people is not sufficiently important for ethical theory 
and those who adopt it (as in the example from The Wild Duck). 
However, an ethics which is more sensitive to consequences and less based on formal 
principles is not a better solution to deal with the radically evil world. As an alternative, Adorno 
19 See PMP, 116f; see also ND, 243. We encounter here what Adorno calls ‘metacritique’, that 
is, his attempts to supplement the philosophical critique of other theorists with sociological 
considerations which show why they got things wrong or could develop only a limited point of 
view. It is important to note that for Adorno ‘metacritique’ is a supplement to philosophical 
critique, and cannot replace it (PMP, 152; ND, 197). On Adorno’s conception of metacritique, 
see also Simon Jarvis, Adorno: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), pp. 12, 153-7.
considers Hegel’s idea of ‘ethical life’ which has consequentialist elements, and ties morality to 
social norms and practices. According to Adorno, adopting such a substantive ethics of 
responsibility today would make morality too dependent on the way of the world; it would 
surrender morality, which tells us what we ought to do, to what is the case. Moral norms would 
then lose much of their critical edge and individuals would be subordinated to the way the world 
actually is (PMP, 163-6). Hence, a substantive ethics of responsibility, rooted in the current 
social world, cannot underwrite right living either-for it is complicit in what makes right living 
impossible: the radically evil society that overwhelms us. 
Apart from these two options--a formal ethics of conviction and a substantive ethics of 
responsibility--Adorno does not discuss moral systems in detail. This is presumably partly 
because he thinks that these two options exhaust most of the space of (credible) moral theories, 
so that if he has shown that they cannot offer us a guide to right living in our current social 
world, then this is true of moral theory more generally.20 
However, Adorno does make some dispersed and brief remarks on other options. For 
example, he objects that Nietzsche’s proposal to proclaim new values does not take seriously his 
own critique of morality (ND, 275; PMP 172-4). Adorno has nothing good at all to say about 
existentialism, whose notion of choice and talk of authenticity he rejects as ideological.21 And he 
thinks that ‘the concept of virtue has taken on an archaic sound’ because of the breakdown of the 
20 Thus, a more formal consequentialism (of the sort familiar from contemporary ethics and as 
also intended by Max Weber in his ‘ethics of responsibility’) is not a live option for Adorno 
either, though it is less clear why this is so. Perhaps, he accepts the Kantian criticisms of such a 
moral theory (e.g., that it is too demanding) as true in respect to the current society; and he might 
be worried that such an ethics is open to the formalism objection (either it is empty, or it 
implicitly relies on the current social norms after all, for example in using a particular conception 
of welfare as its criterion for measuring the goodness of consequences).
21 Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity, tr. K. Tarnowski and F. Will (London: Kegan & Paul, 
1973); see also ND, 49-51, 276-8; PMP, 13f, 176.
social practices and institutions that made the exercise of virtues possible (PMP, 98).22 
Moreover, the emphasis on people’s character and dispositions typical of virtue ethics tends to 
detract from the real problems and their real cause, namely, the radically evil and overwhelming 
capitalist society (PMP, 10-16). Finally, it is unlikely that Adorno would have accepted a full 
ethics based on compassion, since, as we have already seen, compassion gives rise to an 
antinomy in this society.
In sum, it is Adorno’s view that the problematic nature of living in late capitalism affects 
moral theorising deeply and cannot be fully addressed by such theorising. His moral philosophy 
mainly takes the form of fighting the illusions and pretensions to which moral philosophy itself 
gives rise, namely, its claims to guide, or underwrite, right living. However, Adorno’s own moral 
philosophy is not just restricted to this critical function, as we will see now.
How to Live Wrong Life
It might seem that Adorno’s moral philosophy consists solely in critique and does not contain 
any positive views or practical recommendations whatsoever. And this is, indeed, a widely held 
view, both among his critics (who think that it is problematic for a theory with emancipatory 
intent to not have practical import),23 and some of his defenders (who think that his theory is 
22 See also C. Menke, AVirtue and Reflection: The ‘Antinomies of Moral Philosophy’@, 
Constellations 12, no. 1 (March 2005) pp. 36-49. There are, hence, some parallels after all 
between Adorno’s and the Aristotelian accounts of the problematic nature of moral life in the 
modern social world.
23 The charge that Adorno’s theory has no practical import was made by his New Left critics in 
the 1960s and 1970s, but is not restricted to them. For it also played an important role in the 
reorientation of the Frankfurt School by second and third generation theorists; see, for example, 
A. Honneth, Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory, tr. K. Baynes, 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991) Chapter 3, especially pp. 95f.
merely explanatory, not normative).24 
However, there are both textual and other grounds which speak against this. And in the 
last decade a number of authors have argued that Adorno’s philosophy contains an ethics, or 
even that it is ethical through and through.25 What speaks for the claim that Adorno’s philosophy 
contains an ethics is that he puts forward an amalgam of ethical ideals, prescriptions and even a 
categorical imperative of his own. 
For example, Adorno suggests that, in the absence of the possibility of living morally, 
one should aim to live one’s life in such a way that ‘one may believe oneself to have been a good 
animal’ (ND, 299; tr. mod.). One of the things which seem to make one a good animal is to 
identify with others and their plight, to show ‘solidarity with the tormentable body’ (ND, 285). 
Such solidarity arises out of the abhorrence of physical suffering, which has direct motivational 
force for human animals (ND, 365), and for other animals as well insofar as Adorno situates this 
abhorrence within the context of natural evolution. 
What is at issue here is not a rationalised form of pity, motivated by thoughts of 
reciprocity or reward, since such thoughts would undermine identification-based solidarity.26 
Rather, at issue is the natural compassion, a ‘physical impulse’ (ND, 285) of which animals are 
allegedly capable (though they might show this only in exceptional circumstances, such as the 
rare instances of an animal raising a young of a different species). Adorno thinks that it is one of 
the problems of modern society, and the preeminence of instrumental reasoning within it, that 
24 For a recent example of the latter view see G. Tassone, ‘Amoral Adorno: Negative Dialectics 
Outside Ethics’, European Journal of Social Theory 8, no. 3 (2005) pp. 251B67
25 For the first of these views, see J. G. Finlayson, ‘Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable’, 
European Journal of Philosophy 10, no. 1 (2002) Section 3; for the stronger view, see J. M. 
Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
26 See, for example, MM, 33.
such solidarity is disappearing. Our social context engenders the opposite of identification-based 
solidarity, namely, bourgeois coldness. It is this coldness--the ability to stand back and look on 
unaffected in the face of misery--which made Auschwitz possible (ND, 363). Identification-
based solidarity is, therefore, an important element for counteracting bourgeois coldness and 
finds its expression in the moral impulse against suffering (ND, 286, 365). At the same time, 
solidarity is something to which we can only aspire, not something we are currently able to fully 
achieve. 
In the absence of a socially institutionalised and fully functioning ethical life, the 
conditions for the cultivation of this solidarity are not given. In this sense, Adorno is not so much 
advancing a prescription as describing an ethical ideal. And one can find other ethical ideals in 
Adorno’s writings, such as his suggestion that modesty might be the only suitable virtue in our 
current predicament. By suggesting this, he means to say that we should ‘have a conscience, but 
not insist on our own’ (PMP, 169f; ND, 352), that is, we should make ethical demands on 
ourselves and others, but without behaving self-righteously. Adorno is not confident that we will 
succeed in this delicate balancing act--it is again something towards which we can only strive. 
Adorno also puts forward ‘negative prescriptions’ of how to live wrong life. In particular, 
he puts forward the prescription that we should resist what society makes of us (PMP, 167; ND, 
265). Although resistance will be futile most of the time, trying not to join in (or, where joining 
in cannot be avoided, at least not do so fullheartedly) is something which we are obligated to do, 
given the radical evil of our current social world.27 
In one instance, Adorno goes further and suggests that we face a ‘new categorical 
27 Adorno never explicitly and directly put forward the prescription to overthrow the radically 
social world (as one would expect him to do). This might have to do with a number of factors, 
such as the Cold War context in which he was mainly writing, his fear of that such a prescription 
could backfire (e.g., by provoking a repressive backlash), and the fact that he thought that 
currently only resistance can be achieved because the moment for a revolution had been missed.
imperative’, namely, ‘to arrange our thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, 
so that nothing similar will happen’ (ND, 365). This new imperative is unlike Kant’s in a number 
of ways: it mentions Auschwitz (and a set of events), rather than being merely formal and 
ahistorical; it refers explicitly to actions and consequences, rather than focussing on principles or 
intentions; it is only negative, minimalist and strict in its prescription, rather than enjoining wide, 
positive duties and underwriting a full-blown morality; and it is ‘imposed by Hitler upon human 
beings in their state of unfreedom’ (ND, 365; tr. mod.), rather than being the self-legislated 
principle of autonomous, individual agents. Nonetheless, the new categorical imperative, 
arguably, shares one property with its Kantian predecessor: it is categorical in the sense that the 
normative force of the prescription to stop another Auschwitz from happening is not dependent 
on whether we have the requisite inclinations, ends or attitudes. For even if ‘morality survives’ 
only ‘in the unvarnished materialist motive’ (ND, 365)--that (bodily) suffering should cease--the 
new categorical imperative applies also to those who ignore, repress or lack this motive.28
In sum, Adorno advances both ideals and negative prescriptions, including one of a 
categorical nature. Hence, he does subscribe to an ethics of sorts by giving whatever guidance is 
currently possible about how we should live and how we should not live our wrong lives. This 
ethics only offers negative and minimalist guidance insofar as Adorno tells us mainly what we 
should avoid and provides us only with a general sketch, not a fully worked-out picture. Yet, he 
would say that nothing more than this limited guidance can be offered today. In the absence of 
the possibility of right living, and the inability of moral philosophy to underwrite such living, the 
most we can prescribe and strive for is to live less wrongly.
However, one might object that no practical recommendations or prescriptions, even if 
28 However, this interpretation of Adorno’s categorical imperative does not answer further 
puzzles about it, such as whether a particular historical event can give rise to a prescription of a 
categorical nature and whether this prescription is meant to hold indefinitely.
they were merely of a negative and minimalist nature, could flow from Adorno’s philosophy. If 
Adorno thinks that individuals are determined by society, how could they resist it? And how 
could moral theory prescribe to them that they should resist society? Would this not violate the 
principle ‘ought implies can’, that is, the principle that we can only obligate people to do 
something if there are able to do it? 
In reply, we have to return to Adorno’s conception of freedom and extend our 
understanding of it. As we saw earlier, autonomy involves a capacity for self-determination, but 
Adorno claims that such autonomy (or, as he also calls it, positive freedom) is currently denied to 
us.29 However, along with this idea of autonomy, he takes from Kant a more limited conception 
of freedom, namely, negative freedom as independence from external determination.30 As we 
have also seen, Adorno, unlike Kant, denies that the determination in question comes from first 
nature. Rather, it is the determination by society from which we have to make ourselves 
independent in order to be negatively free. And while autonomy is completely blocked in late 
capitalism, Adorno does not reject the possibility of negative freedom within it. As he writes at 
one point: ‘There has been as much free will as people wanted to free themselves’ (ND, 265; tr. 
mod.). 
Now, to admit that negative freedom is available to us (at least sometimes and to some 
extent), is not sufficient for a full-blown morality, as Adorno is well aware. Instead, it is only 
possible to make negative and minimal prescriptions. Such prescriptions are compatible with 
Adorno’s conception of freedom because they simply ask us to make use of our negative 
29 See, for example, MM, 37f; ND, 231f, 241.
30 See Kant, Practical Philosophy, op. cit., p. 94. Note that negative freedom for Kant and 
Adorno includes both freedom of action from external constraints and also freedom of thought 
from such constraints (that is, it includes the idea of Mündigkeit: the courage to think for oneself 
without direction from others).
freedom to resist society and the forms of wrong life within it. Still, making use of our negative 
freedom will never be sufficient for living autonomously: even on the few occasions where we 
are able to resist determination by society, we are not directing our lives, but merely reacting to 
the ‘changing forms of repression’.31 Moreover, while negative freedom might make resisting 
wrong life possible in some instances, there will be too few of them to add up to right living. 
Hence, this defence of Adorno is compatible with his negative moral philosophy presented in the 
first two sections of this essay.
However, problems remain. For example, even if the possibility of negative freedom 
sufficed to underwrite a minimalist ethics, Adorno owes us an account of how individuals are 
capable of such freedom. Sometimes he sounds as if the social world is determining us to an 
extent that even mere resistance to it is impossible.32 Either this is an exaggeration meant to bring 
to our attention the precarious nature of our predicament; or Adorno has to tell us how, even 
within late capitalism, it is possible for some individuals, when they are lucky, to see through the 
workings of society and resist it (ND, 41). 
Moreover, Adorno’s moral philosophy faces perhaps an even graver problem. He has 
long been criticised for not being able to underwrite the normativity contained in his philosophy, 
that is to say, he is accused of not being able to account for the standards with which he operates 
31 Ibid.; see also ND, 231. Perhaps, the idea of negative freedom allows us to rescue a limited 
notion of individual responsibility for Adorno: if we are negatively free, we are responsible for 
our acts to the degree that we can be obligated to act in certain ways (such as resist the pressures 
to join in) and be blamed (albeit not necessarily legitimately punished) for failing to do so. A full 
sense of responsibility would require for Adorno that people (a) live in a social arrangement 
where their acts would have real, attributable effects (ND, 264); (b) have the ability to avoid 
living wrongly; and (c) are autonomous, not just negatively free.
32 See, for example, ‘Unfreedom is consummated in its invisible totality, which tolerates no 
outside any more from which it might be seen and broken’ (ND, 274; tr. mod; see also ND, 243). 
in criticising late capitalism and in prescribing resistance to it.33 In particular, his philosophy is 
thought to be too negative. Critics argue that any account of normative standards requires 
knowledge of and appeal to the good--for example, we may only be able to say of a sculpture 
that it is bad, if we invoke the idea of a good sculpture. However, within Adorno’s philosophy, 
knowledge of, the good (or the right) is impossible for the following reasons: late capitalism is 
deeply evil and we, hence, cannot learn about the good from its realisation in the world. Our 
conceptual capacities are deeply implicated in this evil and are, consequently, no use either to 
gain such knowledge; and even our imaginative capacities are too damaged to acquire any 
determinate idea of how a free society and the good life would look like (ND, 352). 
This problem might be called the problem of normativity. It is especially pressing when it 
comes to Adorno’s moral philosophy: to deny that right living is possible and to prescribe certain 
forms of living over others seems to require knowledge of the good. In the literature, a number of 
responses have been suggested, ranging from (1) a denial of the problem to (2) the suggestion 
that the good (or a good) can be known within Adorno’s philosophy after all and can be used to 
underpin his ethics to (3) the claim that Adorno can account for the normativity inherent in his 
philosophy without appeal to the good or the right.34 However, this is very much a live issue in 
the contemporary debate and more needs to be said to solve this problem, if, indeed, it can be 
solved.
33 Jürgen Habermas was perhaps the first who explicitly stated this criticism in ‘Theodor 
Adorno: The Primal History of Subjectivity: Self-Affirmation Gone Wild’, Philosophical-
Political Profiles, tr. F. G. Lawrence (London: Heinemann, 1983), pp. 99-110, especially p. 
106).
34 The first strategy is implicit in the nonnormative reading of Adorno’s philosophy; see 
Tassone, ‘Amoral Adorno: Negative Dialectics Outside Ethics’, op. cit. For the second, see 
Finlayson, ‘Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable’, op. cit. I have been working on the third 
strategy in an unpublished manuscript, ‘The Good, the Bad and the Normative’.
Conclusion
We have seen why Adorno thinks that (right) living has become problematic in the modern 
world. We have also seen that moral theory cannot just point to a way out of these problems, but 
is deeply affected by them. However, as shown in the final section, this does not mean that 
nothing can be said about how we should live in late capitalism: Adorno does offer us some 
limited guidance on how to live and what to do within our current predicament. In this sense, the 
common objection that Adorno’s moral philosophy is devoid of practical recommendations can 
be rejected--as emphasised in a wave of publications on Adorno’s moral philosophy over the last 
decade. There are other objections which, perhaps, have not been fully answered in the literature 
so far. Still, it is fair to say that Adorno’s moral philosophy presents us with an important 
challenge to the way we normally think about our lives and moral theory. It might not be a 
systematic theory and it might not give us all we expect from a moral philosophy, but we have 
seen that there are reasons why this is the case and why moral philosophy cannot provide or 
promise more in our current predicament.
